US Congress Passes the Strengthening Medicare Secondary Payer Rules Act: Will it Help?

By Jason D. Lazarus, J.D., LL.M., MSCC, CSSC

On December the 19th the Strengthening Medicare Secondary Payer Rules Act was passed by the House.   The Senate passed the Act on December the 21st.  It is on its way to President Obama to sign.  The SMART Act will modify some of the current processes related to Medicare conditional payment recovery.  While there are some significant improvements, it falls short of fixing all flaws in the MSP system when it comes to conditional payments.  The good news is that it creates a 3 year Statute of Limitations for recovery actions relating to conditional payments.  The mediocre news is that while it streamlines the process for obtaining conditional payment amounts it no longer has the enforcement provision originally proposed that would have stripped Medicare of the right to pursue recovery if they failed to timely provide the information.  Below is a summary of the changes the bill makes to the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.

Bill Summary:

  • Requires CMS to issue a “potentially” final demand before settlement, judgment or award
  • Establish a right of appeal regarding conditional payments for insurance companies and self insureds
  • Create a 3 year SOL
  • Discontinue the use of the full SSN for mandatory insurer reporting
  • Make fines permissive for defendants/insurers who don’t comply with the mandatory reporting

Bill Details:

Either party, 120 days before the reasonably expected date of settlement, judgment, award or other payment, notify the Secretary of the impending resolution of the case.

The Secretary shall maintain a website portal that will provide access to information regarding items and services paid for by Medicare related to the notice.  It must be updated timely but not later than 15 days after the date a payment is made.  The website must include provider or supplier name, diagnosis codes, date of service and conditional payment amounts.  It must also identify claims and payments that are related to a potential settlement, judgment, award or other payment.  There has to be a secure method for electronic communications.  Lastly, the website must permit a download of a statement of reimbursement amounts being claimed by Medicare.

Obtaining the statement of reimbursement, if done within the prescribed periods of time, shall constitute the final conditional demand amount.  There is a protected period which is 65 days from the notice, which can be extended by another 30 days.  If settlement occurs during this period and the statement was downloaded within 3 business days of settlement then it shall constitute the final demand.

If there are discrepancies in the statement of reimbursement amount, the Secretary must provide a timely process to resolve such discrepancies.  The discrepancies must be resolved by the Secretary within 11 days after receiving documentation of the discrepancies or the Secretary loses the right to dispute those discrepancies.

A right to appeal and appeals process must be created by the Secretary through the promulgation of regulations.  However the appeal rights would be limited to the applicable plan (so only for defendants/insurers) and only relate to the subsections of the SMART Act.

There are two provisions relating to Mandatory Insurer Reporting.  The first makes assessment of fines for non-compliance with the reporting requirement discretionary versus mandatory.  The second gives the Secretary 18 months to eliminate the use of the Medicare beneficiary’s Social Security number for the reporting process.

Lastly, the SMART Act provides for a 3 year Statute of Limitations on recovery actions by the government.  The 3 years runs from receipt of notice of settlement, judgment, award or other payment.

To see a copy of the text of the Act, click HERE

 

Below is a statement issued by the AAJ after the passage on the 21st:

Dear Colleague,

With the help and hard work of the AAJ Public Affairs team, the U.S. House and Senate have passed a bill that will bring certainty to the Medicare Secondary Payment (MSP) reimbursement process! This legislation is a huge victory for your clients on Medicare. It will simplify their lives—and your practices.

The version of the SMART Act that passed mandates a three-year statute of limitations on the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) so that the agency cannot ask for additional money from clients or their attorneys after the statute expires.

In addition, the bill will simplify the current online portal process for calculating MSP reimbursement. An improved online process will help you resolve your Medicare Secondary Payer claims faster and easier. While the SMART Act offers great improvements, AAJ knows there is still more work to be done. We will continue working to improve the MSP process.

Much of the time at the end of this Congressional session has been consumed by the “fiscal cliff” negotiations. Lawmakers have resisted passing any legislation that deviated from this discussion. AAJ Public Affairs staff Sarah Rooney, Kate deGravelles, and Sue Steinman provided exceptional counsel to ensure that this legislation passed.

AAJ knows how many of you continuously struggled with CMS to receive timely, final reimbursement numbers. Many of you worked with AAJ Public Affairs to advocate for this legislation, and now, after more than two years, we have an accomplishment that will make a difference for lawyers all across the country.

Thank you for your support as an AAJ member. We could not have done this without you. When you stand with us it makes a tremendous difference in our ability to achieve positive advocacy results.

Best Regards and Happy Holidays,

   
Mary Alice McLarty Linda Lipsen
President CEO
American Association for Justice American Association for Justice

 

ERISA: Put New Teeth Into Plan Document Requests with 1024(b)(4)

One of the keys to properly defending against an asserted subrogation or reimbursement claim from an ERISA plan is making requests to the plan administrator.  ERISA places certain responsibilities upon the plan administrator to assist with the proper management of ERISA qualified employee welfare-benefit plans and to promote communication with the plan beneficiaries. One of the major responsibilities of the plan administrator, as to dealing with the providing of information to beneficiaries, is contained in 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4).

This section of the statute deals with requests for information made upon the plan administrator:

29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4)– The administrator shall, upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated.

In attempting to determine the existence and validity of the purported ERISA subrogation or reimbursement claim, obtaining the items listed in 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) is of the utmost importance.  Attorneys should make a formal request under 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) as the requested documents will establish the funding status, identify the plan sponsor, and establish the limits of the health plan’s recovery rights. However, attempting to obtain all of these documents can be fruitless and very frustrating.  The U.S. District Court for North Carolina dealt with this issue in Strickland v. AT&T Benefit Plan, 2012 WL 4511367 (W.D.N.C.). In this case the court ordered the plan to produce its “plan document,” recognizing that terms of a Summary Plan Description are not, in and of themselves, enforceable under Cigna v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866.  You can use this case to your advantage with ERISA plan administrator or recovery agent.

The ERISA statute mandates that the Summary Plan Description be written in an understandable manner so as not to be confusing to the beneficiary.

29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) – [The SPD] shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan.

In Cigna v. Amara the Supreme Court ruled that “taken together we conclude that the summary documents, important as they are, provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but that their statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan” This language seems to make it clear that under 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) the court would find that the plan administrator has an obligation to produce the Master Plan Document (MPD) as well as the Summary Plan Document (SPD).

Typically a claim summary and a SPD are the only documents returned to the requesting beneficiary, or their attorney following their 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) request.  In light of the recent string of cases following Cigna v. Amara, which speak to the need to compare the SPD to the MPD, the plaintiff attorney should insist that the plan administrator is required to provide both under 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4).(See Also, McCravy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Nos. 10–1074, 10–1131, 2012 WL 2589226 (4th Cir. Jul. 5, 2012); Skinner v. Northrop Grumman Retirement Plan B, 673 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.2012); Israel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 7:11–793–TMC, 2012 WL 3116544, at *5 (D.S.C. July 31, 2012)).  In fact, the clear language of 29 U.S.C, 1024(b)(4) requires that “any…contract or other instrument under which the plan is establish or operated” be provided to the requesting beneficiary.

Under ERISA 502(a)(3), the self-funded ERISA qualified health plan only has the authority to enforce “the terms of the plan.” The cases cited above make it clear that to determine the “terms of the plan” the MPD must be compared with the SPD in order to establish the obligations of the beneficiary.  It logically follows that the plan beneficiary must have the MPD to do this evaluation.  The mechanism for the beneficiary to obtain these documents is 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4), so the educated plaintiff’s attorney will not agree that the plan administrator has complied with 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) until he has possession of both documents.

These cases illustrate the need for the plaintiff attorney to make his 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) requests early.  This will not only allow the early evaluation of the alleged ERISA plan’s recovery rights, but also begins the penalty timer.  It is our belief that failure to provide both the SPD and MPD within the 30 day time limit causes the $110.00 per day penalties under 29U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(b) & 29 CFR § 2575.502c-1 to begin.

Demand what your client is owed from the plan administrator.  Do not accept the SPD as “good enough” from the ERISA plan administrator or their recovery agent.  Use their lack of compliance as a tool to reduce the amount your client must pay back to the ERISA plan.  Put some teeth in your 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) requests by starting the penalty timer ticking.

From Roger Baron: 8th Circuit Exonerates Law Firm Doggedly Pursued for Liability on ERISA Reimbursement Claim

The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Treasurer, Trustees of Drury Industries v. Sean Goding, No. 11-2885.  This is a situation where the ERISA plan doggedly pursued the law firm which had represented the ERISA beneficiary in securing a tort recovery.  The law firm had disbursed the settlement funds by paying its attorney fee to itself and releasing the remainder of the funds to the client (ERISA beneficiary) who eventually declared bankruptcy.  Because the reimbursement claim of $11,423.79 was uncollectible from the beneficiary (due to the bankruptcy), the ERISA plan sued the law firm in federal court “asserting theories of equitable lien by agreement, restitution, imposition of a constructive trust, tortious interference with contractual relations, and conversion.”  The federal trial court ruled against the plan.  The plan would not accept the ruling, however, and “stretched out the litigation more than a year after the initial decision for no legitimate reason.”  The trial court again ruled in favor of the law firm and assessed attorney fees against the plan.  The ERISA plan then brought this appeal.  This opinion “affirms the district court on all issues,” holding that

Although [the law firm] acknowledged the existence of the lien against the settlement proceedings, it never agreed with [the ERISA plan] and [ERISA beneficiary] to honor the Plan’s subrogation right. Because [the law firm] was not a party to the subrogation agreement, [the ERISA plan] cannot enforce that agreement against [the law firm].

Prior 8th Circuit case law, the Ford case, had imposed liability on an attorney, but the Ford case was distinguished by virtue of the fact the attorney in Ford had agreed “to honor the plan’s subrogation right.”  In this case, there was no such agreement.  A mere acknowledgement of a lien assertion is not tantamount to an agreement to “honor the plan’s subrogation right.”  This decision lines up with the 9th Circuit decision of Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner, 50 F.3d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1995).

As to the award of attorney fees in favor of the law firm, the ERISA Plan argued, “ERISA does not permit the award of attorneys’ fees to attorneys that act as counsel to their own firms.”  This opinion rejects that argument and finds that the trial court “did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees in this case.”

Click HERE to view the opinion.

ERISA Liens: How to turn the McCutchen gray into green for your client

By Vice President & Director of Lien Resolution

The uncertainty that exists regarding a self-funded ERISA plan’s ability to refuse reduction of their claim based upon equitable principles can be used to increase your client’s net recovery.   A gray area was created in ERSIA healthcare subrogation and reimbursement rights by the 11th Circuit’s April 2010 ruling in Zurich American Insurance Co. v. O’Hara.  This opinion stated that with proper language an ERISA qualified health plan could avoid the “common fund” doctrine.  (See also, Admin. Comm. of Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. Associates’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (8th Cir.2007); Administrative Committee of Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.’ Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.2003);  Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot and Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.2003).  Normally this doctrine would require the plan to reduce their recovery to reflect the attorney fees that were incurred to create the “common fund” from which both the plaintiff and the self-funded ERSIA plan recover their monies.  For example if the injured plaintiff must pay a 33.3% contingency fee to his attorney for his efforts in obtaining the settlement or award, then the self-funded ERISA plan’s recovery should also be reduced by this percentage.

The gray area surfaced four months after Zurich American Insurance Co. v. O’Hara when the 3rd Circuit ruled in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen that despite plan language to the contrary “US Airways’ claim for reimbursement under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA is subject to equitable limitations”.  This gray area intensified in late June 2012 when the 9th Circuit weighed in on the side of the 3rd Circuit and ruled in  CGI Technolgies v. Rose  that a Court in Equity cannot have its powers limited by contract.  Therefore CGI Technologies’ attempt to have Ms. Rose contract away the equitable principles of “common fund” and “made whole” was not permissible.  At this point the gray area deepened into a full split in the Circuits and on the following Monday the U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen.

Now that this question about the superiority of plan language over equitable principles is before the Supreme Court, it is the perfect time to turn this gray area of case law into green for your injured client.  Before the week wherein CGI Technolgies v. Rose was decided and U.S. Airways v. McCutchen was granted certiorari, the recovery vendors for the self-funded ERISA groups thought themselves immune to equitable defenses.  They would direct any plaintiffs’ counsel or plan participant to the 5th, 7th, 8th and 11th Circuits when asked for reduction based upon “common fund” or “made whole”.  Those same vendors and recovery agents would counter the power of the 3rd Circuit’s ruling in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen by saying that was only law in one Circuit.   Things have changed and so should the plaintiff lawyer’s negotiation tactics.

When attempting to obtain a reduction for your client be sure to raise the fact that Supreme Court is considering overriding express plan language with traditional equitable principles.  The self-funded groups and their recovery vendors are well aware that U.S. Airways v. McCutchen has been granted certiorari and that the influential 9th Circuit has articulated support for this position in CGI Technolgies v. Rose.  Though they are aware of the status of these cases, they are more keenly aware that time may be running out for their practice of recovering 100% of their claim without regard to equity.  It is essential that a plaintiff‘s attorney place the self-funded ERISA plan or its agent on notice that they are also aware of this potential for significant shift in the power paradigm.

Plaintiff’s counsel should articulate that any demand by the self-funded ERISA qualified health plan for a 100% repayment without regard to equitable principles, especially “common fund” is a gamble.  It is key for the plaintiff’s attorney to remember that neither the self-funded ERISA group nor their recovery vendor has a business model based upon litigation.  The ERISA subrogation and reimbursement recovery business model is dependent on negotiation and compromise.  You should stress the time value of money to the ERISA group or its agent.  A two-thirds repayment today is better than a two-thirds repayment next summer.  This old concept is strengthened by the argument that by next summer it may very well be the law that the maximum a self-funded ERISA plan would be entitled to is less than two-thirds.

Uncertainty in how the U.S. Supreme Court will decide U.S. Airways v. McCutchen has created insecurity on the part of self-funded ERISA plans already.  The plaintiffs’ bar needs to leverage this uncertainty and insecurity into large reductions for their injured clients.

Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Portal is Live

                      The Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Portal is Live!

A new online Self-Service Tool to help manage your Medicare recovery case.

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has implemented a new web-based tool designed to assist in the resolution of Liability Insurance, No-Fault Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation Medicare recovery cases. The new tool is called, The Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Portal (MSPRP).

The MSPRP gives users (attorneys, insurers, beneficiaries, and TPAs) the ability to access and update certain case specific information online. Activities that currently require written communication or telephone calls to the Medicare Secondary Payer Recovery Contractor will soon be able to be done through the portal.

The MSPRP will allow users the ability to electronically perform the following activities:

  • Submit Proof of Representation or Consent to Release documentation – Instead of mailing in an authorization, users will be able to      upload authorizations through the portal.
  • Request conditional payment information –      Requesting an updated conditional payment amount or a copy of a current      conditional payment letter will be as simple as clicking a few buttons.
  • Dispute claims included in a conditional payment letter – Users will be able to view the claims listed on the conditional      payment letter and dispute unrelated claims online.
  • Submit case settlement information –      Users will be able to input settlement information online and upload a      copy of the settlement documentation through the portal.

Click here to learn how to register and access the portal. All information on the new portal is located in the Tool Kits section above.

From Roger Baron: “unclean hands” is equitable defense to claim under ERISA § 1132(a)(3) according to Oregon Federal Court

Reprinted with Permission of Roger Baron

In Ayers v. LINA, No. 6:08-cv-06287-AA, (D.Or. April 19, 2012), the court was adjudicating a dispute over LTD benefits under ERISA coverage.  The plaintiff sued alleging wrongful denial and the ERISA insurer counterclaimed for an alleged overpayment of $99,885.  This court ruled in favor of the plaintiff on coverage and then addressed whether the equitable defense of “unclean hands” is available as a defense to an action brought under ERISA § 1132(a)(3).  The court rejected LINA’s argument that “equitable theories do not apply to ERISA claims” by noting that LINA’s cited authorities merely stand for the proposition that “federal common law rules of contract interpretation cannot be applied to override the express terms of an ERISA plan.”   LINA’s cited authorities “do not address whether equitable defenses, such as unclean hands, are applicable to claims brought under section 1132(a)(3).”  The court then rules in favor of the participant, holding, “LINA cannot recover any overpaid amounts pursuant to 1132(a)(3) if Ayers can demonstrate that it was acting with unclean hands.”  As to whether or not “unclean hands” exists, the court holds that there is a “genuine issue of material fact,” overruling both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the counterclaim.

The discussion of “unclean hands” as an equitable defense to an action ERISA § 1132(a)(3) is found on pp. 36-47 of the court’s opinion.  To view the opinion click HERE

Outsourcing of Lien Resolution – The Florida Supreme Court’s Ruling on 4-1.5

By Jason D. Lazarus, J.D., LL.M., MSCC, CSSC

The purpose of this post is to inform Florida attorneys about the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of the proposed amendment to Rule 4-1.5.  Before discussing the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection, I first want to give you some background.  In the early part of 2010, an ethics opinion was sought from the Florida Bar regarding a lien resolution attorney charging a reverse contingency fee on reduction of hospital liens.  The ethics opinion issued by the bar concluded it was impermissible because when you add the reverse contingency charged by the lien resolution attorney to the contingency fee charged by the PI attorney, it resulted in too large of a fee overall.  The bar ethics opinion concluded any attorney fee charged by a lien resolution attorney would be too much because PI attorneys customarily resolved the liens as part of the underlying case at no additional fee.  Since the PI attorney is already charging a max fee at 40%, any additional fee would be excessive.  The opinion would have precluded any fee for a lien resolution attorney if the PI attorney was already charging the maximum allowed contingency fee.

The Bar ethics opinion was appealed to the Board of Governors by the requesting attorney.  By rule, that appeal went first to the Board of Governors committee called the Board Review Committee on Ethics.  That review committee then recommended to the entire Board that the ethics opinion should be upheld.  When it went before the entire board, some PI lawyers on the Board of Governors raised some serious concerns about the ruling and its effect.  The ethics opinion was then tabled.  Subsequently, the President of the Florida Bar appointed a special committee to review the issue and propose a rule change to give guidance to the plaintiff’s bar and lien specialists on what was permissible.  The proposed amendment to Rule 4-1.5 came out of that committee.  The Bar approved the amendment and it was sent up to the Florida Supreme Court for approval.  When the rule was discussed at the Florida Supreme Court’s hearings, Floyd Faglie spoke on behalf of the rule.  Based upon the questioning of the Justices, it did not appear they really understood the current state of affairs as it pertained to lien resolution.  Subsequently, the Court opened up the rule to commentary.  There was only one comment filed regarding the rule and it was anti-adoption of the rule.  The comment was made by a plaintiff PI practitioner.

On April 12th, the Florida Supreme Court ruled on the proposed amendment to rule 4-1.5.  Here is what the court said:

“With respect to rule 4-1.5 (Fees and Costs for Legal Services), the Bar proposes new subdivision (f)(4)(E) and related commentary addressing subrogation and lien resolution services in contingent fee cases. This subdivision would provide that a lawyer in a personal injury or wrongful death case charging a contingent fee must include in the fee contract information about the scope of the lawyer’s representation relating to subrogation and lien resolution services; the rule would also provide that some medical lien and subrogation claims may be referred to another attorney for resolution with the client’s informed consent. The Court received one comment addressed to this proposal. After considering the concerns raised in the comment and the discussion at oral argument, we decline to adopt new subdivision (f)(4)(E). Indeed, we take this opportunity to clarify that lawyers representing a client in a personal injury, wrongful death, or other such case charging a contingent fee should, as part of the representation, also represent the client in resolving medical liens and subrogation claims related to the underlying case. Other technical corrections to rule 4-1.5 are adopted as proposed.”[1]

Given all of the foregoing, the question is what now?  The answer is we default back to the rules pre-proposed amendment of 4-1.5.  What complicates matters is the fact that there is a negative outstanding ethics opinion regarding charging fees for lien resolution in addition to a standard maximum PI contingency fee.  In situations where a flat fee is being charged for lien resolution services, the lawyer can absorb the cost or make sure that when combined with the contingency fee that the total fees do not exceed the maximum contingency fee.  Another alternative is that the client can contract with a lien resolution provider or attorney directly to resolve the health care liens and arguably the issue is avoided.  There are problems with the latter approach as it may not completely resolve the conflict created by the Florida Supreme Court’s statements rejecting the proposed amendments to rule 4-1.5 and the negative ethics opinion of the Bar.

What is clear is that the Florida Supreme Court didn’t say that outsourcing of lien resolution to third party specialists was impermissible. The opinion only addressed the proposed amendment of rule 4-1.5 and focused on fees that were permissible related to resolution of medical liens.  So Florida attorneys will have to look to the current rule 4-1.5 and the opinion of the American Bar Association[2] when considering outsourcing of lien resolution. The rejection of the proposed amendments to rule 4-1.5 does not mean that Florida attorneys can no longer seek out third party lien resolution specialists to assist with complex healthcare lien resolution issues.  With the intricacies and nuances of healthcare lien resolution growing at an exponential rate, bringing in experts may be crucial to maximizing the client’s net recovery and preservation of future benefits.  Accordingly, attorneys in Florida must weigh all of these factors when making the decision whether to outsource healthcare lien resolution functions and we encourage this type of analysis.

Synergy’s lien resolution services group remains committed to assisting trial attorneys in the State of Florida.  If you have any questions about these issues, please contact Synergy at (877) 242-0022.


Is your MSP compliance provider doing more harm than good by advocating to ignore Medicare’s future interests?

By Jason D. Lazarus, J.D., LL.M., MSCC, CSSC

With Medicare Secondary Payer (“MSP”) Compliance on everyone’s minds these days, it is no wonder that MSP vendors have tried to capitalize on these fears by offering services targeting them.  The problem is that some of these vendors may be doing more harm than good.  There is a national MSA provider and vendor that is offering an opinion letter to plaintiff personal injury attorneys (and to a lesser extent defendants) stating that no MSA is needed in certain liability settlements.  The letter provides a false sense of security.  The letter focuses on the risk of Medicare targeting the personal injury attorney with a recovery action.  However, that isn’t the real risk.  The real risk, and it is a big one, is that the plaintiff attorney might be sued for legal malpractice if a Medicare eligible client is denied future injury related care as a result of the settlement without being informed of their options or properly protected when it comes to the MSP.  With the implementation of mandatory insurer reporting for Medicare beneficiaries, all defendants must report settlements[1] (currently 50k or more) to Medicare.  Reporting includes the ICD9 codes related to the claimed injuries.  Reporting allows Medicare to flag those ICD9 codes and then deny payment for that future injury related care.  If the client is denied Medicare coverage for injury related care, what good is that no-MSA letter provided by this vendor?

In the case of a denial of future injury related Medicare covered services, the client would be left with a Medicare appeals process that does not let them see the inside of a court room for 420 days in certain circumstances[2].  Who would the client sue if that were the case?  While they likely would have a claim against the vendor that provided that letter, the more attractive target may be their own attorney that turned to this particular vendor and secured the letter on their behalf.  Legal malpractice exposure related to denial of future Medicare injury related benefits could be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.  It is a very large exposure for plaintiff, personal injury practitioners and one that should not be taken lightly.  This is particularly so in the case of attorneys who rely on these opinion letters issued without a solid legal basis or foundation.  In reviewing said letter, it appears there are some misstatements and major inaccuracies.  Below I will delve into these issues and address the alternatives to a “no-MSA” opinion letter for those that are Medicare beneficiaries.

As a preliminary matter, I must make clear that the only time a personal injury lawyer needs to address this issue is if their settlement involves a Medicare beneficiary or arguably[3], those who have a “reasonable expectation” of becoming a Medicare beneficiary within 30 months.  A fundamental flaw with the letter created by this particular vendor, in my opinion, is that it acknowledges an obligation to address Medicare’s future interest but then opines it isn’t necessary simply because the recovery was too small.  Fundamentally, that is problematic because there is no basis for that assumption.  Furthermore, the letter states, inaccurately, that “[f]ederal laws establishes MSAs to prevent legally responsible parties in workers’ compensation or liability settlements from permanently shifting the burden of future medical expenses for injury related care to Medicare.”  There are no such “laws”.  There are some regulations that can be cited for the proposition that you can’t shift the burden in workers’ compensation cases when a Medicare beneficiary settles his or her claim.  Those regulations are inapplicable to liability settlements and are irrelevant in the context of a letter addressing whether to implement a liability set aside.  A more accurate statement would be that currently Medicare interprets the Medicare Secondary Payer Act as requiring protection of Medicare’s future interests when resolving a liability case.

The letter I reviewed was written in the latter part of last year.  It says that CMS has issued no guidance about when or how to use MSAs in third party liability cases.  That simply is not true.  There are two handouts/memorandums issued last year that address Medicare Set Asides in third party cases.  The first and most important is the Stalcup handout/memo issued in May of 2011 by the Dallas Regional Office Director for CMS, Region 6.  The handout, by its own words, indicates there are no “laws” requiring a set aside.  However, the handout does indicate that the law does require “the Medicare Trust Fund be protected from payment for future services whether it is a Workers’ Compensation or liability case.”  CMS’ method of choice for protecting the Medicare trust fund from making payments for future Medicare injury related care is a set aside according to the Stalcup handout/memo.  The Stalcup handout is not a memo from CMS’s headquarters and only applies to the states the Dallas regional office covers so it is limited in scope.  The second is a memo from the CMS headquarters office in Baltimore issued in September of 2011.  In this memo CMS provides a procedure to avoid establishing a liability Medicare set aside.  The memo provides that if the treating physician certifies in writing that the treatment for the injuries suffered in the accident are complete and that future Medicare covered services for the injury will not be required then a set aside isn’t necessary.  The Stalcup handout/memo is consistent with the public statements CMS has made regarding MSAs in liability cases.  The September 2011 memorandum from CMS HQ tells us when you don’t have to establish a liability Medicare Set Aside which presumably means CMS’s position is that in certain cases you do have to establish a liability Medicare Set Aside.  Accordingly, it is difficult to claim CMS has provided no guidance about liability Medicare Set Asides.

What I don’t disagree with is the methodology the letter employs in terms of its analysis of whether the set aside issue needs to be addressed.  First, the letter analyzes whether there is a permanent burden shift from a primary plan (liability insurer) to Medicare for future injury related care and the injury victim’s need for future injury related care.  If those two issues are addressed with a yes, then the letters says to look at Medicare entitlement or reasonable expectation within 30 months[4].  If the answer is yes, then look at whether the claim resolves future medical.  If yes, then the letter says to look at the gross recovery to determine whether it compensates the injury victim for future medicals based upon a damages versus recovery analysis.  This is where the analysis goes astray as there is absolutely nothing in the letter which examines the damages suffered versus what was recovered to support the opinion of no MSA being needed.  I would assert there is nothing which would ever support this type of opinion.  I will explain why further below.

Ultimately the letter says that although the vendor recognizes the injury victim client IS AN MSA CANDIDATE, an MSA is not warranted since the settlement does not contain sufficient proceeds to cover future injury related medical expenses.  While I believe you can potentially get to that opinion in the right case, there is no analysis or justification in the opinion letter I reviewed for that position.  I would propose that there is a much better way to deal with this issue and one that would protect the attorney from a legal malpractice claim instead of focusing on whether Medicare might bring a recovery action.  There is no law that provides for Medicare to recover damages in the context of failure to establish a set aside.  There would have to be a large extension of current conditional payment recovery laws under the MSP to justify any type of potential action to recover in the area of Medicare set asides.  Even if such an action were allowed, what would be the damages anyway?  There would only be a few scenarios where there is a potential for damages but as far as I know there has not been a single action by Medicare against any personal injury attorney in workers’ compensation cases or liability settlements that deal with failure to establish a set aside.  How could Medicare bring an action against a plaintiff attorney when there is no way that the attorney can force a client to set money aside if the injury victim refuses?  That really isn’t the primary issue though.

Getting back to an alternative solution to the situation where the case involves a Medicare beneficiary but there are limited settlement dollars.  Instead of just focusing on an opinion related to having no MSA, it makes more sense to estimate the future Medicare covered services and then apply an appropriate reduction methodology.  If you are going to recognize the need for an MSA like this vendor does in the letter, shouldn’t you do the analysis and justify a very small set aside with a proper analysis?  So what would that look like?  I would propose the following hypothetical:  Case is settled for $50,000 policy limits.  40% fee of $20,000 and costs of $2,500.  There is a small Medicare lien of $5,000.  Client will net $22,500.  An MSA estimate provides that Medicare’s exposure for future injury related care is $100,000.  The total value of the case if there had been no policy limits is $1,000,000.  The client has recovered 2.25% of their total damages.  The set aside based on an Ahlborn type of analysis[5] would be $2,250.  That type of analysis is what I would suggest adequately protects the attorney and the client.  While I would acknowledge that CMS has never approved this type of methodology, they have not disapproved of it either.  What CMS has said in the two memorandums issued in 2011 is that you have to properly address this issue.  An opinion letter that recognizes a set aside obligation in a liability settlement but then arbitrarily says not to set aside any money because of the small size of the settlement doesn’t afford much protection, if any.  Isn’t it a false sense of security they are selling?  Is it worth the exposure for the personal injury attorney?  Is it worth the potential loss of Medicare entitlement for injury related care for the injury victim?  Wouldn’t it be better to just set aside the $2,250 after a defensible analysis?

There will be certain cases where the MSA estimate and reduction methodology does not yield enough of a reduction from a practical perspective.  For example, if the same scenario I discussed in the same paragraph remained the same but the value of the case was dropped from $1M to $200,000 then the client recovered 11.25% of their damages and the set aside amount would be $11,250.  That would consume half of net settlement.  In that case, an argument could be made based on the underpinnings[6] of the Ahlborn decision, by analogy, that there should be no set aside because if the client were forced to set aside half of their net recovery then they would be setting aside dollars that aren’t necessarily meant to compensate for future medical.  Again, at least there is a rational basis for that argument and an analysis was undertaken to properly address the issue, rather than reliance upon an opinion letter that simply makes some assumptions.

Every lawyer who represents injury victims is going to have to decide what kind of protection they want in this new world of Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance.  Making wise choices is critical to avoid a large amount of potential exposure.  I believe that anyone who has one of these types of opinion letters discussed in this article has a tremendous amount of risk and exposure.  According to the CMS Stalcup handout/memo, if future medicals are funded for a Medicare beneficiary when they settle their case then the attorney “should to see to it that those funds are used to pay for otherwise Medicare covered services related to what is claimed/released in the settlement judgment award.”  The responsibility for defense counsel is a little bit different according the handout.  If future medical is funded, then defense counsel or the insurer “should make sure their records contain documentation of their notification to plaintiff’s counsel and the Medicare beneficiary that the settlement does fund future medicals which obligates them to protect the Medicare Trust Fund.”  “It will also be part of their report to Medicare in compliance with Section 111, Mandatory Insurer Reporting requirements.”  So to properly consider Medicare’s future interest according to CMS, it would necessitate advising the client of the obligation to set monies aside and the potential risk of denial of future injury related care if the issue is ignored.  Further, potentially engaging in the analysis I outlined above may be prudent for proper consideration of Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance.  Failure to properly address this issue can have disastrous consequences for an injury victim and expose plaintiff counsel to potential malpractice claims.


[1] Mandatory insurer reporting was created by amendment to the Medicare Secondary Payer Act by a law entitled the Medicare, Medicaid & SCHIP Extension Act of 2007.  MMSEA for short created a requirement for defendant/insurers to report all settlements with Medicare beneficiaries.  The requirements are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8).  The reporting is being phased in with settlements over $100,000 being reported as of 1/1/12 going back to a settlement date of 10/1/11; settlements over $50,000 being reported as of 7/1/12 going back to a settlement date of 4/1/12 and settlements over $25,000 being reported as of 1/1/13 going back to a settlement date of 10/1/12.

[2] There are five levels of Medicare appeals:

  1. The first level appeal is called a redetermination. Redeterminations regarding claim denials currently are processed by either Fiscal Intermediaries/Affiliated Contractors (FIs/ACs) or Part A and B Medicare Administrative Contractors (A/B MACs). Expedited redeterminations regarding service terminations are processed by Quality Improvement Organizations (QIOs).
  2. A Reconsideration is the second level of appeal. If you are unhappy with an FI/AC, A/B MAC or QIO redetermination, you can appeal to MAXIMUS Federal Services QIC Part A and request a Reconsideration.
  3. The third level of appeal is an Administrative Law Judge Hearing (ALJ Hearing). If MAXIMUS Federal Services renders an unfavorable or partially favorable decision, you may seek a third level appeal, called an ALJ Hearing. To qualify for an ALJ Hearing, you must meet the $120 minimum amount in controversy requirement.
  4. The fourth level of appeal is to the Medicare Appeals Council. If you are unhappy with the ALJ Hearing decision, you may ask the Medicare Appeals Council to review your case.
  5. The fifth level of appeal is Federal Court. If the amount involved is $1180 or more ($1220 beginning in calendar year 2009), you have the right to continue your appeal by asking a Federal Court Judge to review your case.

See http://www.medicarepartaappeals.com/Default.aspx?tabid=547 for more detailed information on each level.

 

[3] I say arguably because the “reasonable expectation” standard comes from a CMS memorandum issued related to Workers’ Compensation Medicare Set Asides.  The standard is a “review threshold” and applies to settlements $250,000 or greater when the injury victim has a reasonable expectation of becoming a Medicare beneficiary within 30 months.  See 4/21/03 CMS Memorandum at Question Two.  The memorandum has no applicability to liability settlements.

[4] Because mandatory insurer reporting only covers Medicare beneficiaries it isn’t very likely that someone who may become a Medicare beneficiary in the future would be denied injury related care.  That being said, I am not advocating that one can ignore Medicare’s future interest in a liability settlement if that reasonable expectation criteria is met, but there is a legitimate argument for that in the context of a liability settlement.

[5] I would argue that this gets to the very root of the issue dealt with in the Ahlborn US Supreme Court decision.  The Ahlborn decision forbids recovery by Medicaid state agencies against the non-medical portion of the settlement or judgment.  While admittedly that decision dealt with Medicaid lien issues and the Medicaid anti-lien statute, the arguments by analogy can be applied in the Medicare set aside context.  The Ahlborn holding gets at the fundamental issue of whether a lien can be asserted against the non-medical portion of a personal injury recovery.  Justice Stevens, in stating the majority opinion, said “a rule of absolute priority might preclude settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the recipient in others.”  Isn’t this so in the Medicare set aside context (which is really a future lien)?

[6] The Ahlborn opinion’s central premise is that Medicaid should not be able to asset a lien against the non-medical portions of the recovery.  I would argue that that similarly in the context of a Medicare beneficiary, CMS should not be able to compel a Medicare beneficiary to set aside funds for future Medical if those funds are coming from the non-medical portions of the recovery.

ERISA Beneficiary and His Wife Where Funds are in a Structured Settlement

Reprinted with Permission from Roger Baron

The 5th Circuit handed down ACS Recovery Services, Inc. v. Griffin today, April 2, 2012.  Mr. Griffin was seriously injured in an auto accident. The ERISA plan paid medical bills of $50,076.19.  The plaintiff’s attorney secured a settlement of $294,439.82 and arranged for a structured settlement annuity “in an effort to avoid any equitable lien assertion” by the ERISA Plan.  Mrs. Griffin received $40,000 for loss of consortium.  The ERISA plan sued Mr. Griffin and his wife, as well as the trustee and the trust designated to receive the annuity payments.  The trial court “dismissed the claims against all of the defendants.”  This decision by the 5th Circuit affirms that dismissal.  The dismissal as to Mr. Griffin and the trustee and the trust is appropriate because “no defendant ever had ‘possession’ of the disputed funds.”  The dismissal as to Mrs. Griffin is appropriate because the ERISA Plan lacks authority to “seek reimbursement out of an award for loss of consortium or out of an award made separately to a beneficiary’s spouse… This money was compensation paid to [Mrs.] Griffin for the loss of her husband’s society and companionship, not as compensation to [Mr.] Griffin for his injury.”

To view the opinion click HERE