LIENS
Welcome to Synergy’s blog page dedicated to the topic of lien resolution. Our team of subrogation experts share their InSights and knowledge on the latest developments and best practices in lien resolution. Stay up-to-date with the latest trends and strategies to ensure that you have the information you need to navigate the complexities of lien resolution.
Repaying Medicare for conditional payments is a necessary but unpleasant process which can result in a greatly reduced net recovery or no recovery at all for an injured Medicare beneficiary. The Medicare Secondary Payer Statute has a repayment formula that is designed to maximize the return of funds to Medicare and provides no consideration for the future well-being of the Medicare beneficiary. The only consideration that Medicare makes in applying its repayment formula is whether or not the amount of the Medicare Conditional Payments is less than, equal to or greater than the gross settlement. (42 C.F.R. 411.37(c); 42 C.F.R. 411.37(d)). Despite Medicare’s blind application of the repayment regulations, there is a way for the injured Medicare beneficiary to increase his/her net recovery. This is by way of obtaining a refund from Medicare which sounds crazy, but it works.
In the worst case scenario where the amount of Medicare Conditional Payments is equal to or exceeds the gross settlement, the injured Medicare beneficiary experiences the harshest treatment. In that circumstance, the Medicare beneficiary must return all of their net settlement (after attorney fees and costs) to Medicare, resulting in a zero net recovery to the plaintiff. The regulations provide:
“If Medicare payments equal or exceed the judgment or settlement amount, the recovery amount is the total judgment or settlement payment minus the total procurement costs.”
(42 C.F.R. 411.37(d))
This is a situation that is happening with increased frequency as the cost of medical treatment rises and a contracting economy forces many parties to carry only the mandatory minimum limits of insurance coverage. The practical effect of this regulation is seen daily by the attorneys who represent injury victims as they wrestle with the equitable and ethical issues of resolving a policy limits case wherein only the attorneys/Medicare will see any portion of the settlement funds. It may even be the case that the only settlement funds come from the Medicare beneficiary’s own Uninsured Motorist coverage. In that case, the injured plaintiff has been paying premiums for insurance coverage just so Medicare and their attorney can be paid in the event they suffer massive injuries. (See 42 C.F.R. 411.50(b) authorizing repayment to Medicare from UIM proceeds).
In an attempt to reduce the unforgiving nature of the repayment formula, many attorneys have looked for ways to ensure their clients see at least a nominal amount of the personal injury settlement. These client centric attorneys often want to reduce or waive their fees and costs once they have received the “Final Demand” from the MSPRC. Despite the good intentions of these attorneys, if they reduce or eliminate their fees without updating the settlement information provided to MSPRC they are committing Medicare fraud. According to the regulations:
“Recovery against the party that received payment—
(1) General rule. Medicare reduces its recovery to take account of the cost of procuring the judgment or settlement, as provided in this section, if—
(i) Procurement costs are incurred because the claim is disputed; and
(ii) Those costs are borne by the party against which CMS seeks to recover.”
(42 C.F.R. 411.37(a))
If the costs (including attorney fees) are not borne by Medicare beneficiary then under the above regulation Medicare would not have applied the reduction formula to their demand for repayment. Yet informing Medicare that the attorney has waived fees or costs will only result in Medicare increasing its repayment demand in the same amount, still leaving the injured plaintiff with nothing. This leaves the only option of “gifting” all or a portion of the attorney fees back to the client, which involves its own set of tax consequences and potential ethical quandaries.
As an answer to this problem, Synergy has developed a low-cost way for Medicare beneficiaries to take advantage of seldom used statutes/regulations to obtain a refund of all or part of the funds which were paid to MSPRC in satisfaction of Medicare’s “Final Demand.” There are three statutory provisions under which Medicare may accept less than the full amount of its Conditional Payment:
1. §1870(c) of the Social Security Act;
2. §1862(b) of the Social Security Act; and
3. The Federal Claims Collection Act (FCCA).
Each statute contains different criteria upon which decisions to waive or compromise Medicare’s claim are considered. Additionally, the authority to grant a waiver or compromise under each of these statutes is limited to specific entities. Medicare contractors have authority to consider beneficiary requests for waivers under §1870(c) of the Act. Whereas, authority to waive Medicare claims under §1862(b) and to compromise claims under FCCA, is reserved exclusively to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”).
MSPRC has the authority to grant full or partial waivers to beneficiaries for whom repayment of Medicare’s Conditional Payments would pose a financial hardship. According to the regulations:
“There shall be no recovery if such recovery would defeat the purposes of this chapter or would be against equity and good conscience.”
(See, 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg (c), §1870(c) of the Social Security Act; 42 C.F.R. 405.355-356; 42 C.F.R. 405.358; 20 C.F.R. 404.506-512; Medicare Secondary Payer Manual (MSP), Chapter 7 § 50.5.4.4).
In order to apply for this “Financial Hardship” waiver, the Medicare beneficiary must file form SSA-632-BK with MSPRC which documents their financial situation. Synergy also includes in this request a letter drafted by the Medicare beneficiary (not their attorney) explaining the undue hardship that repaying Medicare would cause. These decisions by MSPRC are made on a case by case basis. The MSPRC’s manual explains their approach well and provides indicators of whether or not a waiver should be granted.
In addition to a request made to MSPRC for a “Financial Hardship” waiver under §1870(c) of the Social Security Act, Synergy requests a “Best Interest of the Program” waiver direct from CMS under §1870(b) of the Social Security Act. Requests for a waiver under this statute are often overlooked by even the most seasoned attorneys and lien resolution companies. Synergy however understands that the settlement proceeds for which the Medicare beneficiary is fighting to retain is the only source of a recovery for the injuries sustained and must provide for their future needs. Therefore, Synergy vigorously pursues every avenue that can be used to obtain a refund from Medicare. CMS has authority to waive in full or in part Medicare’s claim for repayment when it is “in the best interest of the program.” This rather vague criteria is nowhere further defined and lies completely at the discretion of CMS.
It is important to note that an evaluation by CMS of a “Best Interest of the Program” waiver is a separate and distinct evaluation than a request for a Compromise under the Federal Claims Collection Act (FCCA). As the stakes are high for the Medicare beneficiary, Synergy always makes both a request for this waiver and a request for a compromise when seeking a refund from CMS of the amounts the beneficiary has already paid to satisfy the “Final Demand.”
The third and final method for obtaining a refund from Medicare is a Compromise request made to CMS. Authority to grant a Compromise is granted to CMS under the Federal Claims Collection Act (FCCA). (31 U.S.C. 3711).
The Medicare Secondary Payer Manual compiles the statutory and regulatory sources, articulating the criteria in a straight forward manner as follows:
“[31 U.S.C.3711] gives Federal agencies the authority to compromise where:
- The cost of collection does not justify the enforced collection of the full amount of the claim;
- There is an inability to pay within a reasonable time on the part of the individual against whom the claim is made; or
- The chances of successful litigation are questionable, making it advisable to seek a compromise settlement.”
(Medicare Secondary Payer Manual (MSP), Chapter 7 § 50.7.2)
As one can see, there are many things for CMS to evaluate on a case by case basis to determine if the proposed Compromise should be accepted or not. Synergy has developed detailed processes to insure that each relevant factor is brought to the attention of CMS so that the Medicare beneficiary has the best possible chance for obtaining an acceptance of the offered Compromise.
Obtaining a refund from Medicare of all or part of the funds paid to satisfy the “Final Demand” is not an easy task. It requires intimate knowledge of a variety of statutes, regulations, and the Medicare Secondary Payer Manual. However, it may be the only method by which a severely injured Medicare beneficiary will be able to obtain any portion of their personal injury settlement funds. Synergy has the knowledge and experience to employ all available tactics to obtain a refund for our customers. We also have a successful track record in obtaining substantial refunds for Medicare beneficiaries. We understand the importance of preserving settlement funds for the injured plaintiff and share the client centric mentality of the plaintiff’s bar. To that end, Synergy provides a Medicare Lien Resolution Service at a very low up front cost by taking our fee in proportion to how successful we are in obtaining a refund for the Medicare beneficiary (% of savings).
To see the kind of results Synergy achieves for its clients in terms of lien reduction, click HERE
Applying Collateral Source Statutes to ERISA after Wurtz
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit rendered a major decision on July 31, 2014 holding that New York’s anti-subrogation statute is “saved” from ERISA preemption. (Wurtz v. The Rawlings Company, — F.3d—, 2014 WL 3746801). This ruling holds that neither the express preemption found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(a) nor the complete preemption of 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) protects the ERISA plan from New York’s anti-subrogation statute (N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335).
ERISA plans are able to preempt all state laws, except if the law relates to banking, insurance or securities.
“[T]he provisions of this … chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan…”
29 U.S. Code § 1144 (a)
However,
“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.”
29 U.S. Code § 1144 (b)(2)(a)
The New York anti-subrogation statute in question, § 5-355, specifically stated that:
“[I]t shall be conclusively presumed that the settlement does not include any compensation for the cost of health care services … to the extent those losses … have been … reimbursed by an insurer.” Id.
And
“No person entering into such a settlement shall be subject to a subrogation claim or claim for reimbursement by an insurer and an insurer shall have no lien or right of subrogation or reimbursement” Id.
The 2nd Circuit in New York found that this statute was “saved” under 29 U.S. Code § 1144 (b)(2)(a) as a law that “regulates insurance.” The standard used by the Court in Wurtz was established in the 2003 case Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329. That case established a two prong test.
A law “regulates insurance” under this savings clause if it (1) is “specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance,” and (2) “substantially affect[s] the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.” Id. at 342
In analyzing the first prong of the test the Wurtz court followed the broad rule established in the seminal ERISA case, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). In that case the Supreme Court found that the expansive statutory language at issue “[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement” was more than sufficient to constitute being “specifically directed” at insurance. In fact, the Supreme Court found that even though broad language “does not merely have an impact on the insurance industry, it is aimed at it.” Id. at 61. This is a very helpful point for trial attorneys who will be seeking to apply broadly written collateral source statutes against subrogation claims being asserted by ERISA plans.
The Wurtz court reasoned that the second prong was satisfied by determining that the question of does the statute “substantially affect[] risk pooling” to be an analysis of the impact when the law applies, rather than a question of to how large a group does the statute apply.
“[T]he test is not whether the law substantially affects the whole insurance market—the test is whether the law substantially affects how risk is shared when it applies. For example, even though only a subset of insureds suffer from mental illness, the Supreme Court has held that a law requiring minimum mental health care benefits regulates insurance and is thus saved from preemption. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985).”
Id. at 11
This is the same analysis that First Circuit of Florida undertook when it reached its opinion in 2010. (Coleman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, No. 1D10-1366, December 8, 2010). The ERISA plan in Wurtz was a fully insured plan, which means once N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 was “saved” it applied to the plan. The ability to use the Wurtz rational against self-funded ERISA plan’s, especially in states like Florida, may prove a difficult challenge.
Self-funded ERISA plan’s enjoy unparalleled recovery rights in large part due to the “deemer” clause of 29 U.S. Code § 1144 (b(2)(b). Self-funded ERISA plans are not “deemed” to be insurance and thus even “saved” insurance statutes do not bind them.
“[No self-funded] employee benefit plan … shall be deemed to be an insurance company … or to be engaged in the business of insurance … for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts…” Id.
Thus, most anti-subrogation laws like N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5‐335 have no ability to regulate self-funded ERISA plans. Even Florida’s 768.76 has been “saved” but found inapplicable to self-funded ERISA plans. (See, Coleman v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, No. 1D10-1366, December 8, 2010). Despite the fact that Florida’s collateral source statute applies to a wide range of parties it does not capture self-funded ERISA plans.
The Coleman court explained the three step process for how these self-funded plans escape 768.76 rather succinctly when they wrote:
“State laws directed toward the plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan but are not “saved” because they do not regulate insurance. State laws that directly regulate insurance are “saved” but do not reach self-funded employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws” Id.
Despite this reasoning the Coleman court reminds the plaintiff’s bar that insofar as an ERISA plan is covered by insurance, the Plan is bound by state regulations that would apply to their insurance carrier. (See also, FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 798 U.S. 52 (1990). This language, the fact of the remand in Coleman, and the reasoning of Wurtz mandate that the wise plaintiff’s attorney verify the funding status of the ERISA plan in question. Obtaining the Master Plan Document via a proper 29 U.S.C. 1024(b)(4) request is more important than ever.
In practice the plaintiff’s attorney should attempt to have the self-funded ERISA plan realize the application of Wurtz, Coleman, and FMC to them for the portions of their payments that came from an insured plan or were reimbursed by stop-loss coverage. It is always a solid practice for Florida attorneys to send the ERISA plan a 768.76(6) notice. If the plan does not comply with 768.76(7), inform them that the portion of their claim that represents payments from an insured plan or from a self-funded plan reimbursed by stop-loss coverage has been waived under the above rationale. This should also mean that 768.76(8) will cut off the accrual of that portion of their lien at the settlement date. Additionally, if a resolution is not agreed to, an equitable distribution hearing can be requested. However, it is unlikely that self-funded ERISA plans or their recovery vendors will capitulate on this point. Despite their unwillingness to openly agree with this reasoning, it should give them sufficient pause so they will consider a reasonable compromise.
– See more at: file:///Volumes/Design/Source%20Files/Synergy%20Settlement%20Services/Website%20Development/Site%20Backup%20Feb%202015/www.synergysettlements.com/blog/16905/index.html#sthash.SlongRyy.dpuf
Can a Third Party Hold Settlement Funds Until Medicare Issues a Final Demand?
The Northern District of Indiana thinks it is a jury question as to whether or not the third party carrier acted reasonably in holding settlement funds until Medicare’s Final Demand had been issued (Dolgos v. Libery Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 129369 (N.D. Ind. September 4, 2013)). In the subject case, the plaintiff was injured in a slip and fall, retained counsel, and was able to obtain a settlement in the amount of $20,000from the tortfeasor, who was insured by Liberty Mutual. Despite a settlement being reached, and releases executed, Liberty Mutual refused to disburse funds until the Medicare conditional payment issue had been fully resolved. The plaintiff sued Liberty Mutual for breach of the settlement contract claiming this was an unreasonable delay to which Liberty Mutual responded with a motion of summary judgment.
Liberty Mutual argues that despite having executed settlement releases on January 19, 2012, they acted reasonably by not issuing the settlement funds until December 10, 2012.
“Liberty Mutual argues that it acted reasonably in postponing release of the settlement proceeds until after receipt of Medicare’s final determination letter.
…
If the beneficiary receives a primary payment and does not reimburse Medicare within 60 days, the primary payer must reimburse Medicare even though it has already reimbursed the beneficiary or other party. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.24.
…
Liberty Mutual asserts that, if it had paid Lucille Dolgos the agreed upon settlement amount and later learned that Medicare had already paid her, Liberty Mutual would have had to reimburse Medicare the $403.33”
Dolgos v. Libery Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 129369 (N.D. Ind. September 4, 2013)
Though every party to a settlement which involves Medicare conditional payment issues can sympathize with the apprehension of Liberty Mutual, their all or nothing approach appears unreasonable. The plaintiff’s argument is a common sense one:
“whether it was reasonable for Liberty Mutual to withhold all of the $20,000 settlement payment pending confirmation from Medicare rather than paying most of the settlement payment and withholding only the $403.33 at issue”
Dolgos v. Libery Mutual Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. 129369 (N.D. Ind. September 4, 2013) (emphasis added)
The Court agreed that the question of whether the actions of Liberty Mutual were reasonable is one of material fact and should be decided by a jury. While all parties, including the plaintiff’s attorney himself, understand that liability to repay Medicare attaches to everyone who is involved in the personal injury settlement, that does not mean that the entire settlement can be or should be withheld until the Medicare conditional payment issue is fully resolved. This is an excellent ruling for the plaintiff’s bar to use in confronting what is an increasingly common practice of insurance carriers.
This case involved a Medicare beneficiary who was injured as a result of medical malpractice. When the plaintiff’s attorney settled the personal injury action, Medicare presented a Final Demand of approximately $91,000. The plaintiff’s attorney paid the Final Demand to avoid interest and then engaged Synergy Lien Resolution Services to appeal the amount of the Final Demand.
Synergy’s knowledge of both the Medicare Secondary Payer Act and our unrivaled experience with the Medicare appeals process allowed us to reduce the Final Demand by over 47%, securing a refund of over $43,000 for the plaintiff.
This case involved a serious slip and fall accident that happened on a cruise ship while it was at sea. The plaintiff suffered significant injures, incurring medical damages in excess of $540,000. The injured plaintiff engaged a seasoned trial attorney, but due to liability issues the plaintiff only received a fraction of the case value.
Following that disappointment, the plaintiff was confronted with 2 large subrogation/reimbursement claims, each of which was larger than the total settlement.
When every solution attempted by counsel resulted with the injured plaintiff receiving no portion of the settlement funds, Synergy Lien Resolution Service was engaged. Within a relatively short span the air ambulance service, the largest of the two lienholders which had a claim for over $400,000, agreed to completely waive their claim. The self-funded ERISA plan, being represented by Rawlings & Associates with a claim in excess of $100,000 agreed to reduce their repayment demand by 86%.
Maryland Suspends Attorney for Failure to Repay Healthcare Reimbursement Claim
Failing to deal with the subrogation/reimbursement claims of health insurance carriers has proven to be a possible career ending mistake for one Maryland personal injury attorney. In the September 2013 Maryland Court of Appeals’ review of the disciplinary ruling of Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Leonard Sperling, Misc. Docket Number AG 47, the Court sanctioned an attorney who failed to properly resolve a health insurance reimbursement claim. In this case, attorney Leonard Sperling, who had been admitted to practice in Maryland for nearly 46 years, had his license suspended indefinitely, with the suspension duration lasting a minimum of six months.
Despite this being the second time Sperling was sanctioned for failing to resolve third party lien claims, the Court found no intentional malfeasance. Sperling seems to have been overtaken by changes in the practice of personal injury law as he attempted to use antiquated tactics in negotiating the interest of the health plan’s claim. These tactics might have worked a few decades ago, but they backfired in modern day personal injury practice.
For almost five years Sperling proceeded to either forestall the prosecution of the third party claim or negotiate the outstanding balance and followed principles and practices that had been common place in his previous lien negotiations, but which were now obsolete. One such example is the blanket idea that a claim for health insurance reimbursement must be reduced by attorney’s fees and costs. While this appears to be logical, the ground work required in order to obtain such a reduction requires expert understanding of today’s federal and state health insurance statutes and case law.
Health insurance companies have spent the last quarter of a century training, growing, and expanding their recovery groups and vendors. They have experts, nearly inexhaustible resources, and case law to help them prosecute their subrogation/reimbursement claims. As evidenced in the Court’s decision, the playing field has changed. Today’s plaintiff’s attorney must know that in order to significantly reduce or eliminate a health plan’s subrogation/reimbursement claim, an expert is required. At Synergy we fight these battles daily and our expertise ensures that our clients are not exposed to the aforementioned risks that have jeopardized Mr. Sterling’s legal career. Contact us today and see how we can help preserve the hard fought settlement funds you have obtained for your client, and in a manner that protects you and your firm.
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